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ABSTRACT
IS security policy non-compliance is a problem experienced globally. Organizations have
implemented formal and informal sanctions to enforce policy compliance. Sanctions can be
positive (rewards) or negative (punishment) and may influence employees differently across
different cultures. We propose an examination of antecedents that influence IS security policy
compliance utilizing Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Deterrence Theory in a global
context. Using six different countries, we plan to find if protection motivation and deterrence
factors differ among different cultures through the influence of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.
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INTRODUCTION
Organizations continue to daily struggle protecting their information systems from various
threats and spend billions of dollars to build defenses to counter these threats. Some of these
threats include natural and manmade disasters, errors by internal employees, acts of competitors
with malicious intent, hackers, spyware and viruses (Loch et al. 1992; Willison and Warkentin
2012). The reliance of organizations on information systems and increased connectivity of
organizational information systems to the internet has increased the exposure to threats from
hackers, spyware and viruses (Whitman 2003). The increased threats, along with increased
reliance on information systems, have made most organizations enforce strong countermeasures
to deter these threats. Measures such as physical controls and strict information security policies
have been implemented across most organizations to counter threats to their information
systems.
The threat landscape is further complicated by globalization – organizations have offices and
conduct business operations in multiple countries and employ individuals from different cultures.
In global organizations, special difficulties arise in creating and maintaining effective
information security policies (Long 2004), due to differences in espoused values, traditions, and
practices among business units, as well as variations in their political, economic and legal
environments. Individual attitudes and behaviors, influenced by the national culture of each
individual, have exacerbated these cross-cultural challenges as employees from different cultural
backgrounds interpret global information security policies differently. Many studies have found
that cultural differences significantly influence an individual’s behavioral intention to perform
secure actions and actual secure behaviors themselves because perceptions about certain facets of
attitudes and behaviors differ in each culture. In IS research, cross-cultural studies have found
that individual’s cultural background significantly influences the design, adoption and use of
information systems (Im et al. 2011; Jong-min 2004). In the context of information security,
although many studies have looked at security policy compliance intention of employees using
theories such as Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975), Deterrence Theory (Straub and
Nance 1990), Neutralization Theory (Siponen and Vance 2010), there have been few studies
conducted that evaluated security-related behaviors across cultures, let alone the impact of
cultural values on security policy compliance by individuals. A recent cross-cultural study on
information systems misuse in the U.S and South Korea (Hovav and D’Arcy 2012) found that
deterrent effects of certain security counter measures varied between the two countries along
with age and gender, but the role of culture itself as a direct or indirect antecedent of secure
behaviors was not evaluated.
The proposed study will focus on formal and informal sanctions which are also known as
punishment or “negative sanctions.” This study will also focus on formal and informal rewards
which are also known as “positive sanctions.” According to the Rational Choice Theory (RCT)
and several other criminology theories, humans try to achieve pleasure (rewards/positive
sanctions) and avoid pain (punishment/negative sanctions). Our study will investigate the
differential effect of national culture on how protection motivation and rewards and punishment
(formal and informal sanctions) will influence employees’ intention to comply with
organizational policies. How do employee compliance intentions differ across several unique
countries with vastly different cultures? Under the right circumstances, various punishments
(negative sanctions) have been shown to deter undesirable or deviant behavior. Both formal and
informal sanctions are normally viewed only as negative tools by management (or by society).
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But “sanctions” can encompass both positive and negative organizational events, as illustrated in
Table 1. As exemplified in the table, while a demotion is a negative work-related sanction, a
raise or promotion would be a positive one. Moreover sanctions can also be formal or informal.
Being insulted for poor job performance is a negative informal sanction, but receiving pubic
praise for good work performance is a positive sanction. Thus the objective of our study is to 1)
determine if influences of protection motivation differs across cultures; 2) to determine if the
influence of the presence of positive and negative formal and informal sanctions towards
behavioral intentions differ across cultures; 3) to determine if the security policy compliance
intentions influenced by protection motivation and presence of sanctions differ across different
cultures.
Table 1. Examples of positive and negative formal and informal sanctions
Rewards (Positive Sanctions)
pay raise at the job, performance
Formal
bonus, job promotion
praise or recognition for a job well
Informal
done

Punishment (Negative Sanctions)
reprimand, demotion, or employment
termination
public ridicule or insult for bad job
performance, social or self-disapproval

RESEARCH BACKGROUND
Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers 1975) and Deterrence Theory (Straub and Nance 1990;
Straub 1990) form the primary foundations for the present study. Protection Motivation Theory
(PMT) suggests that individuals act to avoid and prevent threats to their safety and security if and
when they perceive that the threat is sufficiently severe and if they perceive that they are
susceptible to the threat (Rogers 1975). In addition to the appraisal of threat severity and threat
susceptibility, individuals also form perceptions of the recommended response to the threat by
assessing their own individual capabilities (self-efficacy), coupled with an assessment of the
effectiveness of the response (response efficacy) (Bandura and Adams 1977; Witte 1992; Witte
et al. 1996). These two parallel appraisals, threat appraisal and coping appraisal, form the
foundation for the individual user’s behavioral intention to carry out or execute the
recommended response to the threat (Witte 1992, Witte 1996). Previous studies have shown that
threat appraisal and coping appraisal variables, which are the foundation of the Protection
Motivation Theory influence security behavior of individuals (Johnston and Warkentin 2010;
LaRose et al. 2008; Lee and Larsen 2009; Woon et al. 2005; Workman et al. 2008). When
individuals are facing a threat, they are likely to adopt protective behaviors or technologies to
deter the threat.
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980) and Theory of Planned Behavior
(TPB) (Ajzen 1991), which explains the relationships between attitude, intention and behavior of
individuals, have been used widely in IS research and IS security research as well. TPB defines
attitude as an individual’s like or dislike towards a specific behavior and posits that attitude
influences an individual’s intention to carry out that behavior. The relationship between attitude
and behavioral intention has been tested in the context of information security where behavioral
intention to comply with security policies was found to be significantly influenced by attitudes
towards those policies (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009). Further, intention has been
established as a primary antecedent of behavior.
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Having information security policies in place will not protect an organization from security
threats unless the employees actually follow them (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Employees
who are aware of their organization’s IS security policies may still violate them in certain
instances. General Deterrence Theory (GDT), borrowed from the criminology discipline, has
been used by IS security researchers to identify the influence of deterrents or sanctions on
negative behavior such as disobedience of or noncompliance with rules and policies (“deviant
behavior”). GDT posits that security countermeasures can serve as deterrent mechanisms by
increasing perceptions of the certainty, severity and celerity of punishment for non-compliance
of security policies, thus improving security of information systems of organizations. Findings in
criminology show that perceived certainty, severity and celerity of sanctions are negatively
associated with the intention to engage in criminal or socially deviant behaviors (Nagin and
Pogarsky 2001). Previous research in IS Security has adopted and extended deterrence theory in
different contexts, such as testing for influence on behaviors such as software piracy (Peace et al.
2003), security policy compliance (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; Herath and Rao 2009; Pahnila et al.
2007), IS Security effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al. 2003), and IS Misuse intention (D’Arcy et al.
2009).
Perceived certainty of detection and perceived severity of sanctions were both found to have a
significant negative impact on behavioral intention to behave in noncompliant behavior while
some studies found only one of those variables significant. Although previous IS Security
research seems to have moderately consistent findings on perceived certainty of detection and
perceived severity of sanctions, extant studies have largely ignored the perceived celerity of
sanctions. Perceived celerity is defined as the swiftness with which sanctions are applied after
the detection of non-compliance or maladaptive behavior. Research indicates that some
individuals (in some cultures) have a shorter term perspective and others are oriented toward
longer-term processes and outcomes, which may lead to differences in the influence of sanction
celerity.
Our study seeks to find if differences exist in attitudes of individuals in different cultures towards
security policy compliance and if the perceptions of certainty, vulnerability and celerity of
formal and informal, positive and negative sanctions influence behavioral intention to comply
with security policies differently among individuals of different cultures.
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The present study proposes and tests a theoretical model, shown in Figure 1, assuming that the
behavioral intention of individuals to comply with organizational security policies are strongly
influenced by formal sanctions, informal sanctions and security policy attitude, where the
security policy attitude is influenced by the threat appraisal and coping appraisal of PMT.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model
According to the TPB and TRA, attitude influences behavioral intention. Previous IS research
models utilizing TRA and TPB has found this relationship to be significant (Karahanna et al.
1999). IS security research models that hypothesized employee’s attitude towards behavioral
intention to comply with security policies have yielded mixed results. For example, whereas
Bulgurcu et al. (2010) supported a significant relationship, Herath and Rao (2009) found the
relationship insignificant. In different cultures where attitudes are shaped through their national
culture, we expect the attitudes to have different influence levels, including those found in the six
countries we will study.
We hypothesize the threat appraisal variables (perceived severity, perceived vulnerability) and
the coping appraisal variables (self-efficacy and response efficacy) to have a positive influence
on attitudes towards security policies whereas the coping appraisal variable response cost to have
a negative influence on security policy attitudes. The security policy attitudes in turn will
positively affect employee security policy compliance. The informal positive, informal negative,
formal positive and formal negative sanctions will also have a positive influence on security
policy compliance. Furthermore, we hypothesize the perceived severity, certainty and celerity of
formal and informal negative and positive sanctions will have a positive influence on security
policy compliance.
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RESEARCH METHOD
In testing our model, an instrument containing a scenario followed by a set of questions will be
administered to the selected set of respondents from each of the six countries described below.
The questions will measure all the Protection Motivation variables (perceived severity, perceived
venerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy, response cost), perceived severity, perceived
certainty and perceived celerity of positive and negative informal and formal sanctions, security
policy attitude and the behavioral intention to comply with security policies. Our sample will
consist of employees from a diverse set of organizations within the selected countries.
Furthermore, the instrument will capture Hofstead’s five cultural dimensions as explained in
Table 2.
For the proposed study, we will evaluate employees in Singapore, Sri Lanka, U.A.E, Finland,
and the U.S. These countries were selected for several reasons. First, these countries have
significantly different scores on Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as shown on Table 2, which
suggests individuals within these countries may exhibit different intentions and behaviors, based
on differences in espoused cultural values. Though Singapore, U.A.E, and Sri Lanka are all
Asian cultures, they have significant differences on several dimensions and are significantly
different from U.S. in all dimensions. Second, the U.S. (Leidner and Kayworth 2006) and
Singapore (Teo et al. 2008; Yang 2005) have been studied in prior cross-cultural studies in prior
IS research and Singaporean culture is similar to the culture of South Korea, which is a country
frequently used in cross cultural studies. Third, Finland, as a European country, represents
another unique perspective in terms of cultural differences. Finally, one or more authors of this
study has visited, lived in, and experienced the cultures of each of the six countries which
enables us to effectively develop the hypotheses and interpret the results utilizing the in-depth
understanding of each of these cultures. We focused our comparison of the six countries on all of
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. Even though (Hovav and D’Arcy 2011) believe that Hofstede’s
masculinity/femininity dimension is not deemed closely related to the IS security domain, we
believe in certain Asian cultures it may have a prominent influence in an organizational
environment.
Table 2: Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
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CONTRIBUTION
If the proposed hypotheses are supported, the findings of our study will have contributions in
terms of IS security research and practice by examining whether deterrence theory and protection
motivation theory influences individuals’ policy compliance differently when it comes to diverse
cultures. In terms of research contributions, our study would be the first to combine Protection
Motivation Theory along with Deterrence Theory in a cross cultural context. The findings will
also be helpful in organizational decision making process when dealing with creation of
organizational policies. Some of the US-based organizations have branches located in several
countries of the world. Having a ‘one policy fits all’ approach may not necessarily be successful
to these companies, as employees in different cultures are likely to perceive threats and sanctions
differently. The findings will assist these organizations to gain an in-depth understanding of how
these different cultures perceive the threat and coping appraisal variables and how they perceive
the positive and negative informal and formal sanctions. With that understanding, these
organizations can customize their security policies at different locations across different
countries, to cater the cultural aspects of the organization and their employees.
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